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To sustain aircraft readiness in an era in which resources
are increasingly being constrained, it is imperative that
major claimants, and their related program sponsors,
effectively manage their budgets. Budget requests must be
formulated and prioritized to accurately reflect the needs of
the fleet in performing the missions of Naval aviation.
Aircraft engines represent a significant portion of the Naval
aviation budget and programs which affect engines must be
scrutinized to ensure the prudent use of limited funds.
The Component Improvement Program (CIP) , which garners a
substantial portion of the aviation budget for engines, was
designed to enhance the readiness of engines (and related
components) and to reduce life-cycle costs. It has been
suggested that CIP saves the government many times the
investment costs in the form of reduced life-cycle operational
and support costs. [Ref. 1] But, recent cuts in CIP
funding may put the Navy's programs in serious jeopardy. In
fiscal year 1994 only 273 ($62,800,000) of 416 ($99,864,850)
required Navy CIP tasks were funded. For fiscal year 1995 it
is projected that CIP will be funded only $55,997,000 from a
required $101,500,000. [Ref. 2] If the Component
Improvement Program has a direct, positive impact on fleet
readiness, safety, and operating costs, then it would seem
prudent to protect CIP from budget reductions. However,
validation of CIP costs and benefits has proven to be a
difficult process. Continuing research is needed to
accurately portray the return on investment of CIP to ensure
that the Navy and Marine Corps are getting the "most bang for
the buck.
"
The Component Improvement Program typically calls for
significant initial investment with the expectation of reduced
life-cycle costs from improving reliability and
maintainability and from the correction of service-revealed
deficiencies. Specifically, the objectives of CIP are:
[Ref. 3]
• To maintain an engine design which allows the maximum
aircraft availability at the lowest total cost to the
government (primarily production and support costs).
• To correct, as rapidly as possible, any design inadequacy
which adversely affects safety-of -flight
.
• To correct any design inadequacy which causes
unsatisfactory engine operation or adversely affects
maintainability and logistic support in service.
The need to justify the high investment costs of CIP has
been the motivation for several theses conducted at the Naval
Postgraduate School which have attempted to correlate expended
CIP funds with tangible benefits. These theses have focused
on quantifying the CIP investment costs and the meaningful
savings after a modification to an engine component has been
made. One of the important objectives of the Naval
Postgraduate School's research effort is to show conclusive
evidence that the Component Improvement Program is cost-
effective. It is the goal of this thesis to further




Desert Storm proved that the AV-8B Harrier is essential
to Marine Aviation. As a consequence, this aircraft type must
be supported for the long term. This thesis focuses on the
CIP effort for the Rolls-Royce Pegasus (F402) engine used on
the AV-8B Harrier aircraft. The objectives of this thesis are
to:
1. Examine the data bases available for extracting logistic
cost/benefit information concerning the F402 engine, and
identify problems associated with gathering meaningful
information from these data bases.
2. Determine the impact of one significant CIP effort for
one component on the F402 engine (hopefully as a bellwether
of overall CIP cost-effectiveness for the F402).
3
.
Determine whether the Component Improvement effort for
the selected component was, in fact, cost-effective.
4. Refine the methodology for analyzing the Component
Improvement Program for the F402.
C. RELATED RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary questions this thesis seeks to answer are:
1. For what reasons was a single, selected Component
Improvement Program modification to a significant F402
component performed?
2 . What were the total costs to incorporate a change to
this selected "high impact" component?
3. Can the changes, if any, to this component be accurately
assessed given the modification was performed relatively
early in the component's life-cycle and the data needed to
precisely determine the impact of the CIP effort is
incomplete?
4. What will be the estimated total benefits as a result of
the CIP effort to this component?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
It was highlighted during Desert Storm that the High
Pressure Turbine Section, Second Stage (HPT-2) in the
Harrier's Pegasus engine experienced undo failures which
threatened safety-of -flight , degraded aircraft availability,
adversely affected aircraft maintainability, and increased
life-cycle costs. The primary cause of HPT-2 failures was
the failure of HPT-2 rotor blades. HPT-2 rotor blades present
an ideal component for study as these blade failures caused
catastrophic damage. Power Plant Change (PPC) 159 was the CIP
resolution to HPT-2 blade problems. Therefore, this thesis
will focus on the costs and benefits of PPC 159.
There are limitations to this research. First, this
thesis only looks at one improvement for one component for the
F402 engine. Second, data sources are many and diverse and
changing Work Unit Codes (WUCs) for F402 components make an
already difficult process of data collection and analysis even
more difficult. Compounding this problem are changes made to
the F402 in its development. From 1983 until the present the
Pegasus has been redesignated four times.
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II provides a literature review of previous
research conducted concerning the Component Improvement
Program. Chapter III provides the background for analysis and
evaluation for determining the impact of Power Plant Change
159. Included in Chapter III will be a technical F402 engine
background, the process used to decide which component to
analyze, the PPC 159 background and the data collection
process. In Chapter IV the author formulates life-cycle cost
models for HPT-2 blades with and without the CIP modification
incorporation. Chapter V contains break-even and net present
value analyses resulting from the application of the models
presented in Chapter IV. Finally, in Chapter VI the author
provides a summary, conclusions, and recommendations for
future study.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH
This Chapter presents a review of the literature and the
previous research conducted concerning the Component
Improvement Program. The author begins this review with a
report performed by the Institute for Defense Analysis which
has become the basis for CIP research. The remaining review
focuses on the research conducted at the Naval Postgraduate
School, begun in 1990, at the request of N-881, the Naval
Aviation Maintenance Division of the office of the Assistant
Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) , and AIR-536, the
Propulsion and Power Division of the Naval Air Systems
Command
.
A. POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE AIRCRAFT TURBINE ENGINE COMPONENT
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
A paper prepared by the Institute for Defense Analysis
(IDA) for the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition)
discussed the role of, the costs and benefits of, and the
policy options concerning the Component Improvement Program.
[Ref. 4] The paper provides insight from a macro point of
view into the effectiveness of CIP in meeting CIP objectives.
The paper's authors describe in detail the functions of CIP
and the resources needed to accomplish a CIP task. The
authors conclude that the benefits from CIP efforts
substantially outweigh CIP costs.
B. EVALUATION OF AIRCRAFT TURBINE ENGINE COMPONENT REDESIGNS
A thesis, written by Sudol and Price, examined some of the
problems associated with determining the benefits accrued from
CIP. [Ref. 5] The backbone of the thesis was the
development of a component selection process for study and a
methodology for measuring changes in the component's logistics
parameters. The thesis also demonstrated the data collection
difficulties encountered in the process of isolating and
measuring CIP benefits. The major contribution of the authors
to CIP research and this thesis is that they concluded that
the effects of CIP are more effectively assessed at the
component level rather than at the system (engine) level.
They based this conclusion on the theory that the effects of
a specific CIP effort could easily be "lost" if the logistics
parameter changes (as a result of a single CIP action) were
viewed from the engine level because of the complex
interactions of engine components.
C. AN ANALYSIS OF THE AIRCRAFT ENGINE COMPONENT IMPROVEMENT
PROGRAM (CIP) : A LIFE CYCLE COST APPROACH
Borer [Ref. 6] attempted to identify life cycle cost
models used by the Navy and other services to determine CIP
benefits. Comparing Visibility and Management of Operating
and Support Costs (VAMOSC) data for seven aircraft types from
1984 to 1986, he compared Mean Flight Hours Between
Maintenance Actions (MFHBA) and Mean Maintenance Hours per
Maintenance Action (MMH/MA) to show support improvements in
aircraft reliability and maintainability. Although the author
was able to demonstrate general improvements in both MFHBMA
and MMH/MA at the organizational and intermediate levels of
maintenance for the seven aircraft types, Borer was not able
to clearly identify a cause and effect relationship between
CIP expenditures and support parameter improvements.
Borer's findings validated the observation of Sudol and
Price that a researcher must concentrate on the component
level rather than the system level in order to directly
correlate CIP investments with improvements. This thesis will
follow the premise that CIP research should be conducted at
the component level
.
D. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE J-52 AIRCRAFT ENGINE COMPONENT
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
Butler's [Ref. 7] objectives were to associate the CIP
costs with improvements made pertaining to the J-52 engine and
to identify the problems associated with gathering information
from various existing data bases when researching the cost-
effectiveness of the CIP. He showed that of the ten
Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) he studied only one could
be conclusively correlated to an improvement in engine
reliability. The author only used cost information from the
manufacturer's ECP document.
Butler found it frustrating to extract information from
the available data bases available. He examined the Naval
Aviation Logistics Data Analysis (NALDA) database, -the
Maintenance, Material, and Management (3-M) database, and the
Aviation Engineering Maintenance System (AEMS) database. The
author concluded that while these databases contained a
plethora of information, they were too difficult to use. He
further concluded that "even if the information was readily
available concerning component improvements, the task of
determining success or failure would be daunting." Butler
believed that the complex interaction between engine
components and the impact of various improvements made to many
engine components simultaneously made CIP effectiveness
assessment perplexing.
E. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE J-52 COMPONENT
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM AND THE IMPROVED MAINTENANCE
PARAMETERS
Gordon [Ref
. 8] followed the research effort of Butler to
correlate CIP dollars spent on the J-52 engine to improved
maintenance parameters at the component level. The major
focus of the study revolved around developing a methodology to
quantify CIP effectiveness by using existing databases and by
maintaining an open dialog with key J-52 managers. He
researched Failure Maintenance Actions rather than Mean Flight
Hours Between Maintenance Actions as an indicator of engine
reliability. The author continued to use the Engine Component
Improvement Feedback Report (ECIFR) , as others had done, to
track engine performance. Gordon's research efforts, as with
those of his predecessors, were unsuccessful in irrefutably
tying CIP investments to specific improvements. He was,
however, successful in proposing an eight-step procedure to
link the observed improvements in a selected maintenance
parameter to CIP funding.
Again, Gordon demonstrated that measuring the
effectiveness of CIP is a complex and intriguing process
complicated by a lack of understanding of various databases,
the interactions of numerous, simultaneous improvements on
many components, and the complicated coordination between the
many activities and offices required to field an ECP.
F. ESTIMATING CHARACTERISTIC LIFE AND RELIABILITY OF AN
AIRCRAFT ENGINE COMPONENT IMPROVEMENT IN THE EARLY STAGES
OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS
Martens [Ref. 9] provided the methods and equations for
estimating the reliability of a modified component during
implementation. The component failure times were assumed to
have a Weibull distribution. Since CIP changes are often made
through attrition, the complete incorporation into the fleet
engine inventory may take ten years or longer. [Ref. 4] The
author provided a methodology to estimate reliability of a
specific engine component during the early stages of CIP
incorporation. However, Martens concluded that reliability
estimates could not be made until at least one failure of the
10
component had occurred.
G. AN ANALYSIS OF THE COSTS AND BENEFITS IN IMPROVING THE J-
52 FUEL PUMP MAIN GEAR SPLINE DRIVE UNDER THE AIRCRAFT
ENGINE COMPONENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (CIP)
Jones [Ref. 10] continued the research of Butler and
Gordon on the J-52 engine. The main objectives of Jones were
to develop a methodology for extracting useful maintenance
data from the NALDA system and to determine the financial Net
Present Value and Breakeven Point for one ECP for one J-52
component . The author concluded that numerous databases
required extensive manipulation in order to acquire useful
data. Jones extensively and laboriously collected the costs
of, and maintenance performed on one small low cost, low
failure rate component.
Because of the limited scope of his study, the author
cautioned about drawing inferences from the thesis about the
effectiveness of CIP. However, the insights provided by Jones
serve as a baseline from which other research can benefit
.
He was also successful in identifying the CIP funding
associated with the development of a Power Plants Change
(PPC)
.
H. AN ANALYSIS OF THE COSTS AND BENEFITS IN IMPROVING THE
T56-A-427 INTERCONNECTOR HARNESS END AND MATING
THERMOCOUPLE END CONNECTOR UNDER THE AIRCRAFT ENGINE
COMPONENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (CIP)
Murphy [Ref. 11] followed the methodology of Jones to
determine the cost effectiveness of one CIP effort for one
11
component on the T56 engine. Murphy validated Jones' approach
to data collection and net present value and break-even
analysis. Murphy, like Jones, painstakingly detailed the -CIP
funding process and explained the methodology for extracting
maintenance data.
This thesis focuses on the CIP effort on a uniquely
different engine, the F402 . This author will apply the




The purpose of this chapter is to briefly familiarize the
reader with the F402 engine to provide a background for
understanding the effects of a CIP effort on High Pressure
Turbine, Second Stage (HPT-2) blades. This chapter also
provides the logic behind the process for selecting the HPT-2
blades as a candidate for study. Included is a chronology of
events tracing the history of Power Plants Change 159 to
demonstrate how the issue has developed into current
circumstances. The last section of the Chapter describes the
methodology for collecting maintenance data concerning PPC
159.
A. TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE HARRIER'S F402 ENGINE
The Harrier is a unique platform, being a Vertical/Short
Take off and Landing (V/STOL) aircraft. The AV-8B requires an
engine specifically designed to enable thrust to be vectored
to meet the requirements of both V/STOL and normal flight.
The F402 uniquely incorporates:
• Contra-rotating high pressure and low pressure spools (to
minimize gyroscopic couple)
.
• Equal thrust to front and rear exhaust nozzles. Nozzles
swivel for vectored thrust
.
• High pressure air bleed for aircraft reaction controls.
13
• Plenum chamber burning and water injection for thrust
augmentation
.
The F402 engine has undergone evolutionary changes in the
last decade. Table 3.1 illustrates F402 engine redesignations
since 1984. [Ref. 12] Redesignations are effected through
Power Plants Changes.
Table 3.1. F402 ENGINE REDESIGNATIONS
Engine Model Redesignated to DateRedesignated PPC Issued
F402-RR-404 F402-RR-406 1984 unavailable
F402-RR-406 F402-RR-406A 03 Dec 1987 127






F402-RR-408A Not released 169 & 182
F402-RR-408A F402-RR-408 Not released 183 & 185
The engine models do not change immediately with the issue
of a PPC. Rather, engines migrate to a new model when a
baseline of modifications, inspections, and repairs are
performed to the existing engines during Depot and
Intermediate level maintenance. For example, PPC 178 says
that a "406A" engine is redesignated "406B" once PPC ' s 128,
137, 139, 152, 159, 160, 168, 172, and 176 have been
incorporated into the "406A." [Ref. 13] As of April
1994, the F402 inventory consists of six "404s," 225 "406As,"
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three "406Bs," and 79 "408s." [Ref . 14] This
thesis focuses on the F402-RR-406A engine model because there
are few "404 ' s " / "406B' s " and because the "408's" have
incorporated a completely different single crystal blade made
of "CMXS-4" material. Also, no CIP money has been spent on
the "408." The author further selected the "406A" model
engine for analysis as this model was the only F402 model
which presented a sufficient service life (1987 to 1994) for
before-and-af ter collection of maintenance data.
The F402 is comprised of Low pressure (LP) and High
Pressure (HP) turbine cases, an intermediate case, a turbine
case assembly, and an exhaust diffuser assembly (see Figure
3.1) .
LP COMPRESSOR CASE MP COMPRESSOR CASE TOP HEAT SHifcLO EXHAUST DUCT
IHTE RKE01A7E CASE ^ COMPRESSOR DELIVERY DUCT




Figure 3.1. F402 Engine and its Main Components
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There is no mechanical connection between the co-axial LP
and HP rotating assemblies. Combustion takes place in an
annular vaporizing type combustion chamber and the gases .are
expanded across the HP and LP turbines, each of which has two
stages. The "hot section" (which is germane to this thesis)
consists of the Low Pressure Turbine Stage 1 (LPT-1), the Low
Pressure Turbine Stage 2 (LPT-2), the High Pressure Diaphragm
Stage 2 (HPD-2), the Combustion Chamber Case Assembly, the
High Pressure Turbine Stage 1 (HPT-1), and the High Pressure
Turbine Stage 2 (HPT-2). The High Pressure Turbine, Second
Stage assembly contains a rotor with 109 blades. Figure 3.2
is the Illustrated Parts Breakdown (IPB) for the HPT-2 module.
Part number 6 is the blade which is the focus of this thesis.
The High Pressure Turbine, Second Stage is subjected to
both extreme speeds and high temperature. Because of high
centrifugal forces at elevated temperatures, the HPT-2 blades
undergo stretching, or lengthening, which is known as creep.
To promote cooling, the HPT-2 blades have five internal holes
passing from the base of the airfoil section to the blade tip.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the structure of an HPT-2 blade.
16











HP COMPRESSOR DELIVERY AIR
HP TURBINE
SECOND STAGE DISK
Figure 3.3. Details of High Pressure Turbine, Second Stage
Blades
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B. CHOOSING THE HPT-2 BLADES AS A CANDIDATE FOR STUDY
Based on the recommendations of Sudol and Price [Ref. 5]
and Borer [Ref. 6] to focus at the component level, the author
set out to select an F402 component which could be isolated
for study. Sudol and Price [Ref. 5] suggested a component
selection process based on the historic maintenance data
contained in the Engine Component Improvement Feedback Report
(ECIFR) . Gordon [Ref. 8] also recommended beginning the
component selection process by noting improvement trends in
maintenance parameters in ECIFR reports.
The author first collected and analyzed ECIFR reports from
1986 through 1993 for the F402 to ascertain maintenance
parameter trends. From the ECIFR reports JETMF34N, entitled
"Maintenance Actions And Manhours By Work Unit Code" and
JETMF200, entitled "Non-Mission Capable (NMC) Hours by Work
Unit Code," the author selected several "maintenance drivers"
(major causes for maintenance) for further analysis.
Nelson [Ref. 4] stated that "Depot costs are the largest
part of operating and support costs." Previous CIP research
by Jones [Ref. 10] and Murphy [Ref. 11] concentrated on low
impact components that were serviced at the intermediate and
organizational levels of maintenance. However, Jones [Ref.
10] recommended studying a critical, high-cost component.
Because CIP efforts for components serviced at the depot level
offer the greatest potential for benefits, the author searched




Through examination of numerous PPCs maintained at NAVAIR,
and through an open dialog with the F402 Engine Manager,, it
was determined that PPC 159 (HPT-2 blade improvement) would
make an ideal CIP effort for research. Power Plant Change 159
was selected for study because it was:
1. Concerned with an improvement at the component level.
2
.
Involved with a component that was a "maintenance
driver" as revealed from ECIFR reports.
3. Concerned with a component to a F402-RR-406A engine
model
.
4. Addressed a component serviced at the depot level of
maintenance. HPT-2 blades are assigned a Source Maintenance
& Recoverability (SM&R) code of PADZZ which means they are
removed and replaced only at the depot level.
5. Sufficient before and after maintenance data was
available to allow evaluation of the benefits of the CIP
effort and maintenance data was available from 1987 to 1994.
Power Plant Change 159 was approved on 19 October 1991.
HPT-2 blades were further selected for study because PPC
159 aimed directly at achieving the major benefits of CIP
which are: [Ref. 4]
1. Quickly solving safety-of -flight problems which results
in reduced aircraft attrition.
2. Correcting service-related deficiencies, which reduces
unscheduled engine removals and the spare engines and parts
required in the field.
3. Extending the interval between depot overhauls, which
reduces operating and support costs.
HPT-2 failures had resulted in at least one catastrophic
20
aircraft loss. [Ref. 15] Furthermore, HPT-2 blade
failures were the leading cause of unscheduled "406A" engine
removals. [Ref. 16] Power Plant Change 159 also
aimed at extending the time period between Depot overhauls.
Prior to Power Plant Change 159, the F402-RR-406A historically
had a scheduled Major Engine Inspection (MEI), or Depot
overhaul, every 500 flight hours, but had achieved only an
average operating time of 250 flight hours between removal for
Depot level inspections. [Ref. 17] HPT-2 failures
and frequent scheduled maintenance were major contributors to
premature MEI ' s . [Ref. 17]
C. BACKGROUND FOR POWER PLANT CHANGE 159
Table 3.2 provides a brief history of HPT-2 blades.
TABLE 3.2 HPT-2 BLADE HISTORY
DATE DETAILS
1987 F402-RR-406A enters service. HPT-2 blades have
unlimited life. [Ref. 18]
08 OCT 88 Aircraft 162952 crashes. Crash is caused by HPT-2
blade failures (creep) . Engineering analysis
showed blades could not safely operate past 750
hours Time Since New (TSN) . [Ref. 15]
01 NOV 88 Power Plant Bulletin (PPB) 60 is issued to
locate/identify all high-time HPT-2 blades and all
blades with unknown TSN.
10 NOV 88 PPB 61 is issued to remove all high-time HPT-2
blades from service. It introduces 750 hour-limit
on 16 engines with used blades.
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29 NOV 88 Unlimited HPT-2 blade life is reduced to 1000 hour
life limit. HPT-2 blade growth limit is reduced
from .005 inch to .0025 inch. Engine model "404A"
blades could not be reused. Blades damaged by-
creep can not be reworked.
JAN 90- Forty engines experience HPT-2 blade failures with
DEC 91 significant secondary damage.
JUL 9 - Desert Storm highlights continued problems with
JAN 91 HPT-2 failures. 18 blades experience problems
during this time period. Hazardous Material
Reports (HMRs) concerning blades issued from AV-8B
units deployed to Desert Storm.
01 FEB 91 Weibull analysis by both Rolls-Royce and NADEP
Cherry Point showed that HPT-2 blade could be
expected to fail at less than 500 hours with
probability of blade failures increasing with
blade time. 500-hour life limit on HPT-2 blades
introduced to reduce blade failures. One hundred
percent blade replacement at 500 hours is required
if blades are available. There are no reliable
methods for determining blade serviceability in
relation to creep life.
19 FEB 91 ECP 3520R is introduced to change blade material
from Nimonic 115 to single crystal ("RR200"
material)
.
19 OCT 91 Power Plant Change 159 is issued. Nimonic blades
are to be replaced on an attrition basis (as HPT-2
assemblies arrive at the Depot for regular
scheduled/unscheduled maintenance) with single
crystal blades
.
09 MAR 93 Post PPC 159 blades inspection interval raised to
10 00 hours.
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D. MAINTENANCE DATA COLLECTION DIFFICULTIES
1 . Work Unit Code Changes
Because of the dynamic nature of the F4 02 engine, -the
author found it difficult to collect maintenance data from
available sources without first selecting and isolating an
engine model and component. This difficulty was caused by
changing Work Unit Codes (WUC's) for the F402 engine.
Work Unit Codes provide a standard identification system
for the Maintenance Data Collection System (MDCS) and are the
basis for researching historical maintenance data through the
Navy Maintenance and Material Management (3-M) Information
System. According to Mr. Bob Kahoun, the Work Unit Code
Manager, Naval Technical Services Facility (NATSF) , Work Unit
Codes for F402 engines have been modified coinciding with
redesignations of engine models. [Ref. 19] Work Unit
Code series 27200 was carried over from the F402-RR-404 engine
to the F402-RR-406 engine in 1984. In 1985, WUC series 27200
changed to series 27600. In 1987, the F402 engine maintenance
plans were rewritten to reflect transition to the "406A" model
engine which included not only a change in the WUC series from
27600 to 27900, but a completely different WUC breakdown for
the fourth through seven WUC positions (which identify
assemblies, components, and sub-components) . For example, it
was revealed that the WUC for HPT-2 assemblies changed from
2723520 to 2763520 (in 1985) to 2797300 (in 1987) . Further
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complicating the research effort, WUC series 27600 has been
reassigned to the CFM-56-2A-A engine model used on the E-6
aircraft. Work Unit Code series 27A000 has been assigned to
the "408" model engine with 27A500 being assigned to the High
Pressure Turbine section.
2 . Part Number Changes
Pursuing maintenance parameter changes by part number
through the maintenance data bases without first selecting and
isolating an engine model /component can also be difficult.
One component can be identified by several part numbers.
Furthermore, once a Power Plant Change has been fielded, the
component of interest may be changed or replaced by the PPC
.
This new component can also be identified by several part
numbers. For example, the part numbers for HPT-2 blades
before PPC 159 were B936283 or B936285 or B936287,
interchangeably. After PPC 159, the part numbers for the
blades were B511764 or B513175.
3 . Maintenance Data Sources
The author was interested in investigating both the
NALDA data base as Jones [Ref. 10] and Murphy [Ref. 11] had
done, and the NAMSO data base as Jones [Ref. 10] had
recommended. Both of these data bases are derived from input
from Organizational and Intermediate maintenance activities,
and the author was interested in determining their usefulness
and validity concerning research into PPC 159.
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a. NAMSO Data
The author visited the Navy Maintenance Support Office
(NAMSO) at the Naval Sea Logistics Center (NSLC) . in
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, to collect and analyze
maintenance data pertaining to the High Pressure Turbine,
Second Stage. NAMSO is the central data bank for aviation 3-M
data and utilizes 3-M data to produce management information
reports which are used throughout the naval establishment.
NAMSO also maintains hundreds of different management
information reports on microfiche dating from 1965 to the
present and can produce "customized" reports if requested.
Mr. Clarence Cupp, Code N63P at NSLC assisted the author
in collecting 3-M maintenance data. Because of changing Work
Unit Codes and part numbers, the author found it burdensome to
manually collect maintenance data from the microfiche.
Instead, Mr. Cupp suggested that the author request a computer
generated Reliability and Maintainability Summary (RAMS) which
summarizes maintenance actions by quarter (by WUC) for
selected equipment. The data collected from this report is
redundant to the data contained in the microfiche, but the
RAMS report is specific to the component of interest and is
user friendly.
b. Depot Level Data
The author also visited the Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP)
Cherry Point, which is the Cognizant Field Activity (CFA) for
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the F402 engine, for the purpose of collecting maintenance
data pertaining to HPT-2 blades. The author discovered that
since HPT-2 blades are a "high impact" and high cost item,
historical data concerning the blades was available in NADEP's
local records. The Depot had maintained published reports and
"briefing papers" pertaining to engine/design problems (with
historical records) which included HPT-2 blade difficulties.
The published reports are detailed and comprehensive. For
example, one published report detailed HPT-2 blade failures
from October 1988 to November 1992 by blade serial number and
included Time Since New (TSN) and Time Since Hot End
Inspection (TSH) for each failed blade. [Ref. 20]
The "briefing papers" are concerned with F402 MEI extension
initiatives (including HPT-2 improvements) and F402 engine
program management decisions. Also, the author was given a
report, written by the F402 Lead Engineer, which contained a
cost /benefit analysis of several CIP efforts (including a
primary evaluation of PPC 159) which led to the " 406B" engine.
[Ref. 21]
c. Intermediate Level Data
The author next visited Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron
14 (MALS-14), at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North
Carolina. This Squadron performs intermediate maintenance on
aircraft (including the AV-8B) assigned to Marine Aircraft
Group 14 (MAG-14) . As was the case at NADEP Cherry Point,
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MALS-14 maintains local records concerning HPT-2 blades
because the blades were a significant problem and readiness
degrader . For example, Rolls-Royce field representatives,
located with MALS-14, are keeping running records for each
engine (with and without PPC 159 incorporated) including TSH
and TSN for HPT-2 assemblies. The author acquired similar
records from Rolls-Royce representatives located with Marine
Aviation Logistics Squadron 13, Marine Corps Air Station Yuma,
Arizona
.
d. NALDA System Data
Finally, the author visited LCDR Keith Harpe, the Fleet
Information Manager at the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)
,
Washington DC, to collect information from the NALDA system.
The author was interested in obtaining condensed, user
friendly, information derived from the NALDA system from the
SYS Company, Crystal City, Virginia, as Murphy [Ref. 11] had
done. SYS is the company that produces the ECIFR reports and
is capable (through in-house COBAL programs) of summarizing
vast data contained in the NALDA system into user friendly
formats. LCDR Harpe contacted Mr. Bob Weaver of SYS who
produced several "summarized" reports for the author from the
NALDA data base for the time period from 1986 through 1993
.
e. navair Data
While at NAVAIR, the author was also able to obtain
"briefing papers," which included historical data concerning
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PPC 159. Mr. Jim Carroll, the F402 engine manager and Mr.
Steve Clark, the F402 Assistant Program Manager, Logistics
(APML) , assisted the author in interpreting .the




As Jones [Ref. 10] and Murphy [Ref. 11] had done, the
author collected Intermediate and Organizational labor rates
from the Visibility and Management of Operations and Support
(VAMOSC) data base. Mr. Phil Rodgers at the Naval Center for
Cost Analysis (code NCA-66) assisted the author in obtaining
VAMOSC data.
g. NAMSO and NALDA Data Dissimilarities
The NALDA database and the Naval Maintenance Support
Office (NAMSO) database are both fed maintenance information
from the Visual Information Display/ Maintenance Action Forms
(VIDS/MAF's) filled out at the Navy's aviation maintenance
sites. Information from these forms are entered into the Naval
Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System
(NALCOMIS) . The NALCOMIS feeds VIDS/MAF information directly
to the NALDA database on a real-time basis. Therefore,
similar maintenance data should be available from both the 3-M
and NALDA data bases. Although the consolidated reports
obtained from both the NAMSO (3-M) and NALDA data bases were
tailored and user friendly, the data contained in the reports
was not similar. Therefore, the author did not have
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confidence in using data for analysis from either the NAMSO or
NALDA reports. Moreover, the data from either report did not
correspond to the data contained in NADEP Cherry Point's local
records. The data from the SYS reports was especially suspect
as the initial reports showed failures for the new (post PPC
159) HPT-2 assembly (Part number: B505102) before PPC 159 was
approved. The author was told that the old and new assembly
part numbers were reversed en the reports and that there was
a "glitch" in the system. [Ref. 22] Time constraints
did not allow the author to further investigate why the data
bases did not match. Perhaps the author did not correctly
specify input parameters when requesting computer runs or the
different F402 WUC ' s contributed to the dissimilarity between
data sources
.
The author believes that data maintained for HPT-2 blades
at NADEP Cherry Point and at MALS-14/MALS-13 is valid. These
maintenance activities are closely involved with HPT-2
problems and are charted to keep accurate account of blade
hours to ensure safety-of -flight
.
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IV. PRESENTATION OF BEFORE AND AFTER LIFE-CYCLE COSTS
A . BACKGROUND
This chapter presents the life-cycle costs associated with
HPT-2 blades for F402-RR-406A model engines before and after
the incorporation of Power Plant Change 159. The results will
be used in the cost-benefit analysis in Chapter V. This
chapter presents three models. The first model displays the
life cycle costs of HPT-2 blades as if PPC 159 was not
incorporated. Because only 101 of 225 engines (45%) have had
PPC 159 incorporated [Ref. 12], and because there have been
relatively few hours on the new blades with no failures, it is
difficult to accurately assess the reliability of the new
blades. Therefore, the second and third models will be
presented to show a possible range of life-cycle costs for the
fleet of "406A" engines with PPC 159 incorporated. The second
model will show the low limit of the range of life-cycle costs
while the third model will show the upper limit of the range.
The second model assumes a 750-hour Hot Section Inspection
(HSI) interval with 100% replacement of the single crystal
blades during the HSI. The Hot Section Inspection interval
can be considered the scheduled maintenance interval. The
" 406A" currently has an HSI interval of 500 hours. HPT-2
blades are the major restriction to an increased HSI interval,
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and both the F402 Engine Manager and Lead Engineer feel
confident that the HSI can be increased to at least 750 hours
with the incorporation of PPC 159 to "406A" engines.
[Refs. 23, 24] As a consequence, the "406B"
(which has PPC 159 incorporated) has an HSI interval of 750
hours. [Ref. 13]
Single crystal blade reliability to date supports at least
a 750-hour HSI as 71 engines (with PPC 159 incorporated) have
registered an average of 250 flight hours per engine without
failure. Of the 71 engines, nine have registered over 400
hours. [Refs. 25, 26] One engine, with PPC 159
incorporated, has reached 500 hours and its HPT-2 assembly was
inspected at the Cognizant Field Activity and was found to be
in "like new" condition and deemed good for another 500 hours
without inspection. [Ref. 27] As a result, the
inspection interval for single crystal HPT-2 blades has been
raised from 500 to 1,000 hours. [Ref. 28]
The third model assumes an HSI interval of 1,500 hours
with 80% of the blades replaced during the HSI. The F402
Engine Manager has expressed optimism that the introduction of
single crystal blades could lead to a 1,500-hour inspection
interval. [Ref. 23] Furthermore, accelerated bench testing
by Rolls-Royce reveals that the single crystal blades are 800%
more creep resistant than the nimonic blades
.
[Ref. 29] Rolls-Royce's Engineering Change Proposal
states that the single crystal blades should experience at
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least a 1,000-hour service life which could be further
extended. However, the ECP also states that the single
crystal blades are subject to oxidation/sulf idation and will
be rejected for this reason rather than creep. The ECP
projects that 80% of the blades will require replacement
during inspections after 1,000 hours (individual blades can be
tracked by blade serial number) .
For the three models presented in this chapter, the author
assumes an operational life of "406A" engines to extend
through the year 2006. This operational life is supported by
Mr. Steve Clark, the F402 Assistant Program Manager
(Logistics). [Ref. 30] The historical (1992 to
1993) and projected (1994 to 2006) costs are presented in
"then year" dollars to aid in the analysis to be done in
Chapter V.
B. LABOR, MATERIAL, AND TRANSPORTATION RATES
As mentioned above, the author acquired Intermediate and
Organizational labor rates from the Visibility of Management
of Operations and Support (VAMOSC) data base. The author
assumed an 8% annual increase in the labor rate as this was
the mean increase of the Intermediate level and Organizational
level labor rates in the data base (1990 to 1992) . The author
acquired Depot labor rates from NADEP Cherry Point's Level
Schedule Repair Program document. The author assumed that
the 8% yearly increase for "I" and "0" labor rates would be
32
suitable for Depot labor rates. The author used the Consumer
Price Index annual increase of 4% (1990 to 1992) to determine
increases in material and transportation costs.
C. AIRCRAFT/ENGINE DATA
Historical AV-8B Class A mishaps are displayed in Table
4.1. [Ref. 23] This table does not include the five combat
losses of AV-8Bs during Desert Storm in 1991.
Table 4.1 HISTORICAL AV-8B MISHAPS
YEAR 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
MISHAPS 3 4 5 6 11 5 8 4
Table 4.2 provides the actual (1992 to 1993) and estimated
(1994 to 2006) yearly fleet of AV-8B aircraft with "406A"
engines installed as well as the total yearly inventory of
"406A" engines and the PPC 159 installation rate.
Using the historical aircraft accident data, the author
calculated a .03 crash rate per aircraft in service. This
rate is assumed to be independent of PPC 159. This assumption
seems valid as only one accident was caused by nimonic HPT-2
blade failure and no accidents have been caused by single
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attrition based on this ratio except for 1992 and 1993
attritions which are actual.
Column 2 reflects aircraft /engine reductions from .the
recently introduced "Remanufacturing Program" where some AV-8B
"day attack" aircraft will transition to "night attack"
aircraft. This transition means that the "406A" engine in the
aircraft will be replaced with a "408" engine and that the
removed "406A" engine will be retired. Column 2 shows the
planned yearly transition. [Ref . 23] Column 3 is the total
projected aircraft/engine reductions per year (Column 1 +
Column 2) . Columns 4 and 5 reflect the beginning year
inventories for aircraft and engines, respectively. Actual
aircraft/engine inventories are used for 1992 through 1994.
Projected beginning year's inventories for future years were
calculated by subtracting projected attritions/transitions
(that occurred during the previous year) from the previous
year's beginning inventory.
PPC 159 is being installed at "the first opportunity" as
the "406A" engines are cycled through the depot for needed
scheduled/unscheduled maintenance. Because the HSI for
nimonic blades was reduced from 1,000 hours to 500 hours in
1991, a high number of HPT-2 rotors were processed through the
depot in that year. This created a delay in the subsequent
scheduled maintenance cycle (when PPC 159 would be installed)
.
Column 6 reflects the number of "406A" engines with PPC 159
installed. Actual installations are shown for 1992 and 1993
35
and projected installations are shown for the remaining years.
Column 7 shows the ratio of engines with PPC 159
incorporated to the total inventory of engines. The author
assumes that not all of the engines with PPC 159 incorporated
will be installed in an aircraft and that the ratio of
aircraft and engines with PPC 159 incorporated will roughly be
the same. In fact, as of June 1994 only 71 of the 101 engines
(71%), with PPC 159 incorporated, have been installed in an
AV-8B.
D. INVESTMENT COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH PPC 159
Table 4.3 shows the Research, Development, Testing and
Evaluation (RDT&E) and Appropriations Navy (APN) costs which
generated PPC 159. Jones [Ref. 10] revealed that the RDT&E
costs can be found from the finalized version of the
contractor's Engineering Program Notice (EPN) . Power Plant
Change 159 was actually generated from funding as noted on two
EPN's (EPN C133 and EPN C143 ) . Mr. Ted Woodgate, Head Pegasus
Projects (United Kingdom) , Ministry of Defense, London,
England explained to the author that the basic design for
single crystal HPT-2 blades for the "406" engine originated in
1988 as a research effort (EPN C133) for the "408" engine.
Engineering Program Notice C143 notes the costs of adapting
the "408" blades to the "406." [Ref. 31]
Mr. Steve Clark, the Assistant Program Manager (Logistics)
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Evaluation for the F402 is jointly funded under the
PegasusSupport Program (PSP) by the United States and the
United Kingdom with the United States assuming fifty percent
of the costs. [Ref. 32]
Columns 1 through 5 present the total (United States and
United Kingdom) RDT&E costs for single crystal HPT-2 blades in
British Pounds Sterling. Column 1 shows the R&D costs from
EPN C133. [Ref. 33] Column 2 shows the costs of
blade and engine testing (EPN C133) provided by Mr. Woodgate.
[Ref. 31] Column 3 shows the Research and Development costs
from EPN C143 . [Ref. 34] Column 4 indicates the
blade and engine testing (EPN C143) costs provided by Mr.
Woodgate. [Ref. 31] Column 5 displays the total annual
Research and Development Costs.
After considering the exchange of British pounds to U.S.
dollars, columns 6 through 9 present the United States RDT&E
costs for single crystal blades and reflect two thirds of the
costs of Columns 1 through 4 . The author assumed an exchange
rate (the current exchange rate) of 1.5 dollars to the British
Pound
.
Jones [Ref. 10] discovered that the APN costs for
implementation of a Power Plant Change can be found from the
Costs and Funding and Milestones chart from the Configuration
Change Control Board's (CCCB) approval of the ECP. Column 10
displays the APN costs to implement PPC 159 as detailed in
CCCB No. 911-0286. [Ref. 35] Column 11 shows the
38
total U.S. annual RDT&E and APN costs.
Columns 12 and 13 were generated to assist the author in
the analysis in Chapter V and are displayed to adjust .the
costs to a 1992 economic basis. To equate the 1988 through
1991 investment costs to 1992 dollars, a future value factor
of 1.10 n was used where n is the number of years into the past
from the beginning of 1992. Column 12 shows future value
coefficients (assuming a 10% rate) . Column 13 shows 1988
through 1991 costs in 1992 base year dollars.
E. LIFE CYCLE COSTS (PPC 159 NOT INCORPORATED)
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show the actual and estimated life
cycle costs caused by HPT-2 maintenance for the fleet of
"406A" engines as if PPC 159 was not incorporated.
1. UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
Table 4.4 presents unscheduled life cycle maintenance
cost. There were 11 HPT-2 failures in 1990 and 29 failures in
1991, and it was estimated that between 17 and 19 failures per
year would continue to occur. [Ref. 21] However, these
failures occurred before the 500-hour limit was imposed for
the blades. Under the 500-hour limit, it was estimated that
blades would fail at the rate of .04 per aircraft in service
per year [Ref. 21] and this rate is roughly consistent with
actual blade failures since 1991. For example, there were 3
failures out of 126 aircraft (without PPC 159 incorporated) in
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and 3 failures out of 60 aircraft (without PPC 159) to date in
1994. Column 1 displays the projected yearly unscheduled
maintenance events (failures) at the rate of .04 failures .per
aircraft in service. The actual failures for 1992 through
1994 would have been higher had PPC 159 not been incorporated.
To determine the additional failures that would have occurred,
the author multiplied the assumed failure rate (.04) by the
number of aircraft with PPC 159 installed (the product of
Column 4 and Column 7 from Table 4.2) . These additional
projected failures were added to the actual failures and their
sum is presented in Column 1.
Column 2 exhibits the Depot level maintenance material
cost per event. The 1994 cost per blade is $1,360 and the
pins to secure the blade cost $.75 each. [Ref. 36]
With 109 blades and 109 pins per HPT-2, the total 1994
material cost per event is $148,321 (1,360 X 109 +.75 X 109).
Column 3 shows the Depot level maintenance labor
costs/event. The 1994 Depot Level Schedule Repair Document
indicates that it takes 42.3 hours to reblade an HPT-2 at a
rate of $174.5 per hour. [Ref. 37]
When an F402 engine experiences an HPT-2 blade failure,
both the High Pressure section and the Low Pressure section of
the engine experience severe damage. [Ref. 38]
Secondary damage occurs to the High Pressure Turbine - First
Stage (HPT-1), Low Pressure Turbine - First and Second Stages
(LPT-1 and LPT-2), and the High Pressure Diaphragm - Stage 2
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(HPD-2). Naval Aviation Depot Cherry Point's study of 21
engines that experienced HPT-2 blade failure indicated that on
average $166,592 in material damage above the costs of .the
HPT-2 itself occurred. [Ref . 20] Column 4 displays this cost.
Column 5 shows the Depot labor costs to repair secondary
damage. An average of 2 01 hours is required to repair
secondary damage. [Ref. 38]
Column 6 shows the Depot level costs per event (the
summation of Columns 2 through 5) . Column 7 displays the
total Depot costs per year and is the product of Column 1 and
Column 6
.
Column 8 displays the Intermediate level maintenance labor
costs associated with an HPT-2 blade failure. Approximately
40 hours are required to disassemble and reassemble the Hot
Section following an HPT-2 blade failure. This involves
replacement of the HPT-2 rotor module, HPT-1 rotor module,
HPD-2 diaphragm assembly, LPT-1 rotor assembly, and LPT-2
rotor assembly with spares from "I" level stock.
[Ref. 39] The author assumed for the first year
(1992) an Intermediate level hourly labor rate of $19.76 which
was obtained from the VAMOSC data base (19 92)
.
Column 9 displays the Organizational level labor costs for
removing and replacing an engine following an HPT-2 failure.
Removing a failed engine and replacing it with an Ready-For-
Issue (RFI) spare requires 140.5 hours. [Ref. 40]
The author assumed for the first year (1992) an
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Organizational level hourly labor rate of $16.45 which was
obtained from the VAMOSC data base (1990 to 1992)
.
Column 10 shows the transportation costs associated with
HPT-2 blade failures. When an HPT-2 fails, the HPT-2 (along
with the remaining components of the Hot Section which
experienced secondary damage) must be transported to the Depot
Overhaul Point (NADEP Cherry Point) for repair.
The AEMS data base indicates that approximately 40% (58 of
146 aircraft in 1994) of the inventory of AV-8B aircraft with
406A's installed are located at Marine Corps Air Station
(MCAS) Yuma, Arizona, and the remaining 60% are located at
MCAS Cherry Point. This installation percentage is very
simplistic and does not include aircraft deployed aboard ship
or to the Western Pacific under the Unit Deployment Program.
Currently, it costs approximately $980 (full truckload
rate) to ship the Hot Section (less the Combustion Chamber
Case Assembly which does not experience secondary damage)
round trip from Yuma to Cherry Point. [Ref. 41]
Because the author was considering costs per unscheduled
maintenance event (for aircraft located at both Yuma and
Cherry Point) the author reduced this figure by 60% to account
for the failures which would occur at Cherry Point (these
would incur no transportation cost).
Column 11 shows the total costs (Intermediate,
Organizational, transportation) per HPT-2 failure (the
summation of Columns 8 through 10) . Column 12 displays the
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total annual (Intermediate, Organizational, transportation)
costs per unscheduled event . Column 13 shows the total yearly
unscheduled maintenance costs created from HPT-2 failures
(Column 7 + Column 12)
.
2. SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
Table 4.5 presents scheduled life cycle maintenance
costs. Column 1 shows the projected annual flight hours for
AV-8B's with "406A" engines installed. A mean of 325 hours
per aircraft per year was determined by taking the average
annual flight hours per aircraft from ECIFR reports from 1986
to 1992. This estimate is also consistent with the scheduled
flight hours for 1994 (55,000 hours scheduled divided by 170
aircraft (146 "406A" engines installed + 24 "408" engines
installed)) equals 323.5 hours per aircraft. Column 1 was
determined by multiplying the yearly aircraft in service (from
Figure 4.1, Column 4) by 325 hours.
Column 2 shows the scheduled maintenance events (number of
blade change-outs) per year. The scheduled maintenance events
were calculated by dividing the yearly flight hours (Column 1)
by 500 (the life of nimonic blades) and then subtracting the
number of unscheduled events (Table 4.4, Column 1). The
author assumed that HPT-2 blade failures would occur close to
the 500 hour blade life. Actual scheduled maintenance events
were used for 1992 and 1993 (less the additional unscheduled
events that would have occurred had PPC 159 not been
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COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 COLUMN 3 COLUMN 4 COLUMN 5 COLUMN 6
YEARLY SCHEDULED DEPOl DEPOI INTERMEDIATE "O" LEVEL
FLIGHT MAINT MATERIAL LABOR LABOR LABOR
HOURS EVEN1S COST/EVENT COS1 /EVENT COST/EVENT COST/EVEN!
VEAH
199? 51350 42 137.131 6 328 1.976 2.311
1993 48750 39 142.616 6834 2.134 2.496
1994 47450 39 148.321 7 381 2.305 2.696
1995 46150 87 154.254 7.971 2.489 2.911
1996 43550 82 160.424 8609 2.688 3144
1997 40950 77 166.841 9.298 2.903 3396
1998 38350 72 173.515 10.042 3.136 3.667
1999 33150 62 180.455 10.845 3.387 3.961
2000 28275 53 187.673 11 713 3.657 4.277
2001 23400 44 195.180 12.650 3.950 4.620
2002 18850 35 202.988 13 662 4.266 4.989
2003 14300 27 211.107 14.755 4.607 5.388
2004 139/5 26 219.551 15.935 4.9/6 5819
2005 13650 26 228.333 17.210 5.374 6.285
2006 13325 25 237.467 18.587 5.804 6.788
UNSCHEDULED JWD
SCHEDULED COM
COLUMN 7 COLUMN 8 COLUMN 9 COLUMN 10 COLUMN 11
1RANS D/I/O/TRANS TOTAL lOIAL TOIAL
COST/EVENT COST/EVENT SCHEDULED UNSCHEDULED SCHEDULED
(COLS 3 THRU 7) COSTS COSTS UNSCHEDULED
(COL 2 X COL8) (TAB 4 4. COL 13 (COL 10*COL 11
VeAH
1992 436 148.183 6.223.665 1.378.027 7.601.693
1993 454 154.534 6026.842 2.156.417 8.183.259
1994 472 161.174 6.285.800 2.624803 8.910.603
1995 491 168.117 14562.259 2.221.517 167837/6
1996 511 175.376 14.335.244 2.186.748 16.521 992
1997 531 182.969 14.062.984 2.145.003 16.20/98/
1998 552 190.911 13.741.807 2.095.724 15.837.531
1999 574 199.222 12.395.575 1.890.075 14.285.650
2000 597 207.918 11.034.223 1.682.124 12.716347
2001 621 217.021 9.531.558 1.452.663 10.984.22?
2002 646 226.551 8.015.357 1.221.205 9.236.563
2003 672 236.529 6.348.444 966 890 7.315.334
2004 699 246.980 6.478.296 986.263 7.464.559
2005 727 257.929 6.608.137 1.005.566 7.613703
2006 756 269.401 6.737.713 1.024.755 7.762.467
45
incorporated) . The 1994 HSI rate is also assumed based on the
1992/1993 rate.
Columns 2 and 3 display the scheduled Depot material costs
and Depot labor costs, respectively. As expected, these are
the same as the unscheduled Depot costs (Table 4.4, Columns 2
and 3 ) .
Column 4 shows the Intermediate labor costs of a scheduled
inspection. At the "I" level, scheduled maintenance takes
approximately 100 hours as opposed to 40 hours for unscheduled
maintenance. [Ref. 39] The reason scheduled maintenance
requires more manhours is that during an HSI, the Combustion
Chamber Case Assembly (which does not experience secondary
damage from HPT-2 failures) must be removed and inspected. As
with unscheduled inspections, a labor rate of $19.76 (1992)
increasing at 8% per year was assumed.
Column 6 shows the "0" level costs of removing and
replacing an engine which are the same as the unscheduled
costs (Table 4.4, Column 9).
Column 7 displays the transportation costs of shipping an
Hot Section from Yuma to Cherry Point. Because the entire Hot
Section (including the Combustion Chamber Case Assembly) must
be transported to Cherry Point for an HSI, the shipping costs
are higher for scheduled maintenance than unscheduled.
Currently, it costs approximately $1,180 to ship a Hot Section
round trip from Yuma to Cherry Point. [Ref. 41] As with
unscheduled maintenance, this figure was reduced by 60% to
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reflect that 40% of the total failures are expected to occur
at Yuma
.
Column 8 exhibits the total cost per HSI (Depot,
Intermediate, Organizational, transportation) which is the
summation of columns 3 through 7 . Column 9 shows the total
annual scheduled costs (the product of Column 2 and Column 8) .
Column 10 repeats the unscheduled costs from Table 4.4,
Column 13 . Column 11 is the sum of the total scheduled and
unscheduled costs for HPT-2 blades as if PPC 159 was never
implemented (Column 9 + Column 10)
.
F. LIFE CYCLE COSTS (PPC 159 INCORPORATED) ASSUMING A 750-
HOUR INSPECTION INTERVAL
1. SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE COSTS
Table 4.6 shows the actual and projected life cycle costs
caused by HPT-2 maintenance (with PPC 159 incorporated) for
the fleet of AV-8B aircraft (with "406A" engines installed)
assuming a 750-hour HSI with 100% replacement of single
crystal blades during inspections. The author also assumed
that no unscheduled maintenance (HPT-2 single crystal blade
failures) will occur after replacement. The author based this
assumption on the fact that there have been no fleet failures
of single crystal blades. [Ref. 16] Also, accelerated blade
testing by the contractor indicates that the single crystal
blades should not fail because of creep. [Ref. 29]
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Table 4.6. LIFE CYCLE COSTS (PPC 159 INCORPORATED) ASSUMING A
7 50 -HOUR INSPECTION INTERVAL.
cJW dilMdiH: i H. :>> : dm d •j .' y : 1 1 d jy :>=
COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 COLUMN 3 COLUMN 4 COLUMN 5 COLUMN 6
SCHEDULED DEPOT DEPOT INtERMEDIATE O" LEVEL TRANS
MAINT MATERIAL LABOR LABOR LABOR COST/EVENT
EVENTS/YEAR COST/EVENT COST/EVENT COST/EVENF COST/EVENT
YLAH
1992 43 142.732 6.478 1.976 2.311 436
1993 41 148.441 6.996 2.134 2.496 454
1994 42 154.379 7.556 2.305 2 696 472
1995 85 160.554 8.160 2.489 2.911 491
1996 58 166.976 8.813 2.688 3.144 511
1997 55 173.655 9.518 2.903 3.396 531
1998 51 180.602 10.280 3.136 3.667 552
1999 44 187.826 11.102 3.387 3.961 574
2000 38 195.339 1 1 .990 3.657 4.277 597
2001 31 203.152 12.950 3.950 4.620 621
2002 25 211.278 13.986 4 266 4.989 646
2003 19 219.729 15.104 4.607 5388 672
2004 19 228.519 16313 4.976 5819 699
2005 18 237.659 17.618 5.374 6.285 727
2006 18 247.166 19.027 5.804 6788 756
COLUMN 7 COLUMN 8 COLUMN 9 COLUMN 10 COLUMN 11 COLUMN 12
TOTAL SCHED TOTAL UNSCHEDULED UNSCHEDULED UNSCHEDULED SCHED AND
COST/EVENT SCHED COSTS EVENTS COST/EVENT COSTS UNSCHEDULED
(COLS 2 THRU 7) (COL 7XCOL 1) TAB 4 4. COL 6 COL 9 X COL 10 COS IS
AND COL 11 COL 8* COL 11
VLAU
1992 153 934 6.619.141 3 344.507 1.033.520 7.652.661
1993 160.521 6581.379 4 359 403 1.437.611 8.018.991
1994 167.407 7.031.109 3 374.972 1.124.916 8.156.025
1995 174.606 14.841.502 14.841.502
1996 182.133 10.575.832 10.575.832
1997 190.004 10.374.202 10.374.202
1998 198.237 10.136.496 10.136.496
1999 206.849 9.142.740 9.142.740
2000 215.861 8.137.970 8.137.970
2001 225.293 7.029.134 7029.134
2002 235.165 5.910486 5910.486
2003 245.501 4.680.895 4.680 895
2004 256.326 4.776.199 4.776.199
2005 267 663 4.871.465 4.871.465
2006 279.540 4.966.503 4.966.503
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Column 1 exhibits the expected number of scheduled Hot
Section Inspections per year. The number of HSI's was
calculated by dividing the projected flight hours per year
(Table 5.5, Column 1) by 750 (HSI interval). Actual HSI's are
used for 1992 and 1993. The number of HSI's for 1994 is also
assumed based on the 1992/1993 actual rate. Because PPC 159
was installed by first opportunity, and because a delay in
scheduled maintenance was caused in 19 91 by a nimonic blade
inspection interval reduction, the author assumes that
remaining nimonic blade replacement (PPC 159 incorporation)
will occur in 1995.
Column 2 shows the Depot material cost for HPT-2
inspection and blade replacement. The costs (in 1994 dollars)
of single crystal blades are $1,390 each and the cost of
retaining wires to secure the blades are $12.64 each. [Ref.
32] There are 109 blades and 227 retaining wires per HPT-2
assembly for a total current material cost per event of
$154,379 (109 x $1,390 + 227 X $12.64).
It takes an additional one hour to secure HPT-2 blades
with wires rather than pins. [Ref. 42] Depot labor
costs are shown in Column 3 (43.3 hours at a rate of $174.5
per hour) . Intermediate labor, Organizational labor, and
transportation costs (Columns 4, 5, and 6, respectively) are
the same as for scheduled maintenance without PPC 159 being
incorporated (Table 4.5, Columns 5, 6, and 7).
Column 7 shows the total cost per HSI (the summation of
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Columns 2 through 7) . Column 8 displays the total annual
scheduled costs (Column 1 X Column 7) for HPT-2 blades with a
750-hour HSI . Column 8 displays the total scheduled costs
(the product of Column 1 and Column 7)
.
2. UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE COSTS
Column 9 shows the actual failures that occurred from 1992
to 1993. Column 9 also shows the actual failures as of July,
1994 with an additional failure assumed for the remainder of
the year. Column 10 exhibits the unscheduled costs per
failure (the sum of Column 6 and Column 11 from Table 4.4.)
Column 11 shows the total annual costs of unscheduled
maintenance and is the product of Column 9 and Column 10.
Column 12 is the total unscheduled and scheduled maintenance
cost for HPT-2 blades with a 750-hour inspection interval
assumed and is the sum of Column 8 and Column 11.
G. LIFE CYCLE COSTS (PPC 159 INCORPORATED) ASSUMING A 1,500-
HOUR INSPECTION INTERVAL
1. SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE COSTS
Table 4.7 shows the actual and projected HPT-2 maintenance
costs for the fleet of AV-8B aircraft (with "406A" engines
installed) assuming a 1,500-hour HSI interval with 80% single
crystal blade replacement during inspections. The author also
assumed that no unscheduled maintenance (HPT-2 single crystal
blade failure) will occur after replacement.
Column 1 shows the scheduled maintenance events per year
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Table 4.7. LIFE CYCLE COSTS (PPC 159 INCORPORATED) ASSUMING A
1,500-HOUR INSPECTION INTERVAL.
COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 COLUMN 3 COLUMN 4 COLUMN 5 COLUMN 6
SCHEDULED DEPOT DEPOT INTERMEDIATE •O' LEVEL TRANS
MAINTENANCE MATERIAL LABOR LABOR LABOR COST/EVENT
EVEN1S/YEAR COST/EVENT COST/EVENT COST/EVENT COST/EVENT
VeAr 436
1992 43 142.732 6.478 1.976 2.311 454
1993 41 148.441 6.996 2.134 2.496 472
1994 42 154.379 7.556 2 305 2 696 491
1995 85 160.554 8.160 2.489 2.911 511
1996 29 128.443 8.813 2.688 3.144 531
1997 27 133.581 9.518 2.903 3.396 552
1998 26 138.924 10.280 3 136 3.667 574
1999 22 144 481 11.102 3.387 3.961 597
2000 19 150.260 1 1 .990 3657 4.277 621
2001 16 156.271 12.950 3.950 4.620 646
2002 13 162.521 13.986 4266 4 989 672
2003 10 169.022 15.104 4.607 5.388 699
2004 9 175 783 16.313 4.976 5.819 727
2005 9 182.814 17.618 5.374 6.285 756
2008 9 190.127 19.027 5.804 6 788
COLUMN 7 COLUMN 8 COLUMN 9 COLUMN 10 COLUMN 11 COLUMN 12
TOTAL SCHED TOTAL SCHED UNSCHEDULED UNSCHEDULED UNSCHEDULED SCHED AND
COST/EVENT COSTS EVENTS COST/EVENT COSTS UNSCHEDULED
(COLS 2 THRU 6) (COL 1 X COL 7) TAB 4 4. COL 6 COL 9 X COL 10 COS IS
AND COL 11 COL 8*COL 11
VLAr"
1992 153.934 6.619.141 3 344.507 1.033.520 7.652.661
1993 160.521 6.581.379 4 359 403 1.437.611 8.018.991
1994 167.407 7.031.109 3 374.972 1.124.916 8.156.025
1995 174.606 14.841.502 14.841.502
1996 143.599 4.169.165 4 169.165
1997 149.929 4.093.063 4.093.063
1998 156.559 4.002.689 4.002 689
1999 163 505 3.613.451 3.613451
2000 170.783 3.219.255 3.219.255
2001 178411 2.783.212 2.783.212
2002 186.408 2.342.531 2.342.531
2003 194 794 1.857.038 1.857 038
2004 203.590 1.896.780 1.896.780
2005 212.818 1.936.643 1.936.643
2006 222.502 1.976.557 1.976.557
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and was determined by dividing the projected flight hours
(Table 4.5, Column 1) by 1,500 (assumed HSI interval) . Actual
HSI's were used for 1992 and 1993. It was assumed that .the
same PPC 159 incorporation schedule would be followed in 1994
and 1995 for a 1,500-hour HSI as a 750-hour HSI as scheduled
incorporation is based on 500-hour replacement of the nimonic
blades. Column 2 shows the Depot material costs per event.
Through the incorporation of PPC 159, 100% replacement of the
nimonic blades with single crystal blades would be required.
Once the incorporation of PPC 159 is complete (again the
author assumed that incorporation will be complete in 1995),
on the average 80% of the blades will require replacement
during each event (based on the ECP) for a total current cost
per HSI of $123,503 (87 blades X $1,390 per blade + 227
retaining wires X $12.64 per wire) . All blade retaining wires
are required to be replaced during HPT-2 blade scheduled
maintenance as each blade must be removed for inspection and
pressure washing. [Ref. 28]
Depot labor, Intermediate labor, Organizational labor, and
transportation costs (Columns 3, 4, 5, and 6, respectively)
remain the same as for scheduled maintenance with a 750-hour
inspection interval assumed (Table 4.6, Columns 3, 4, 5, and
6) .
Column 7 shows the total Depot, Intermediate,
Organizational, and transportation costs per event (the
summation of Columns 2 through 6) . Column 8 shows the total
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annual scheduled costs of HPT-2 blades assuming a 1,500-hour
HSI interval (Column 1 X Column 7)
.
2. UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE COSTS
Column 9 shows the actual failures that occurred from 1992
to 1993. Column 9 also shows the actual failures as of July,
1994 with an additional failure assumed for the remainder of
the year. Column 10 exhibits the unscheduled costs per
failure which is the sum of Column 6 and Column 11 from Table
4.4. Column 11 shows the total annual costs of unscheduled
maintenance and is the product of Column 9 and Column 10.
Column 12 is the total unscheduled and scheduled maintenance
cost for HPT-2 blades with a 1,500-hour inspection interval
assumed and is the sum of Column 8 and Column 11.
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF POWER PLANT
CHANGE 159
This Chapter analyzes the data presented in Chapter IV.
OMB circular A-94 [Ref. 43] requires that investments
made by federal agencies be analyzed by both a Net Present
Value (NPV) and Break-even analysis. This Chapter also
considers some possible additional benefits of PPC 159.
A. NET PRESENT VALUE ANALYSIS
The Net Present Value analysis considers the time value of
money and takes the present value of all expected life cycle
costs concerning PPC 159 for the F402-RR-406A for the three
models derived in Chapter IV. The sum of the present value of
all expected costs over the operational life of the "406A" for
each model is the model's Net Present Value. The NPV's can
then be compared to determine the expected savings (or
benefits or costs avoidance) of the different models. The
difference between the model with no CIP effort (without PPC
159) and the models with PPC 159 incorporated is the expected
benefit of PPC 159 and will be positive if the CIP effort was
effective. The author assumed a capital discount rate of 10%
as this is the generally accepted rate used by the Department
of Defense. For ease of analysis, the author assumed that all
costs occur at the end of the year.
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Table 5.1 presents the Net Present Value analysis with a
base year of 1992. Column 1 is taken from Table 4.5 and shows
the total costs as if PPC 159 had not been implemented.
Column 2 shows the total costs taken from Table 4.6 (PPC 159
with 750-hour inspection assumed) , and also includes the
investment costs of PPC 159 (adjusted to an 1992 economic
basis) . The investment costs for PPC 159 are carried over
from Table 4.3, Column 13 for both the 750-hour and 1,500-hour
inspection models.
Column 3 displays the total costs taken from Table 4.7
(PPC 159 with 1, 500-inspection assumed) and also includes the
investment costs of PPC 159 (adjusted to an 1992 economic
basis) . The column values shown in Table 5.1 were discounted
using the discount factor of 1/1. 10 n where n is the number of
years into the future from 1992. The sum of the resulting
present values for each year is displayed at the bottom of the
columns and is the Net Present Value of each model.
The low limit of the range of savings resulting from PPC
159 is determined by subtracting the NPV of the model assuming
a 750 hour inspection (Column 2) from the NPV of the model
without PPC 159 incorporated (Column 1) . The high limit of
the range of savings resulting from PPC 159 is determined by
subtracting the NPV of the model assuming a 1,500-hour
inspection (Column 3) from the model without PPC 159
incorporated (Column 1) . Thus, the Net Present Value analysis
shows that the CIP effort for HPT-2 blades will save (avoid
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costs) between $17,192,871 and $38,639,494 (in 1992 dollars)
depending on the reliability of the single crystal blades.
Table 5.1. NET PRESENT VALUE ANALYSIS.
COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 COLUMN 3
WITHOUT WITH WITH
PPC 159 PPC 159 PPC 159
SCHED & 750- HOUR 1,500-HOUR
UNSCHED INSPECTION INSPECTION
YtAK
1992 7,601,693 12,868,667 12,868,667
1993 8.183,259 8,018,991 8,018.991
1994 8,910,603 8,156,025 8,156,025
1995 16,783,776 14,841.502 14,841,502
1996 16,521,992 10,575,832 4,169,165
1997 16,207,987 10,374,202 4,093,063
1998 15,837,531 10,136,496 4,002,689
1999 14,285,650 9,142,740 3,613,451
2000 12,716,347 8,137,970 3.219,255
2001 10,984,222 7,029,134 2,783.212
2002 9.236,563 5,910,486 2,342,531
2003 7.315,334 4,680,895 1,857,038
2004 7,464,559 4,776,199 1,896,780
2005 7,613,703 4.871.465 1,936.643






A Break-even analysis provides insight into when the
savings (benefits) accrued from an investment will equal the
costs associated with the investment. To be considered a
success, the CIP investment should have a break-even point
before the end of the concerned component's operational life.
For PPC 159, the break-even point should occur prior to the
year 2006. The author also considered the present value




Table 5.2 presents the data to be used for the break-even
analyses. Column 1 shows the discount factor of 1/1. 10 n where
n is the number of years into the future from the beginning of
1992 .
1. WITHOUT PPC 159 COST DATA
Column 2 exhibits the undiscounted costs (PPC 159 not
incorporated) taken from Table 4.5, Column 12. Column 3
exhibits the cumulative undiscounted costs. Column 4 shows
annual discounted costs for this model (Column 1 multiplied by
Column 2). Column 5 shows the cumulative discounted costs.
The total cumulative discounted costs equal the model's NPV
(from Table 5.1)
.
2. PPC 159 INCORPORATED, 750-HOUR MODEL COSTS
Column 6 displays the undiscounted costs (PPC 159
incorporated, 750-hour inspection assumed) from Table 4.6,
Column 12 with the total value of the CIP investment up to
1992 added (from Table 4.3, Column 13) . Column 7 exhibits the
cumulative undiscounted costs. Column 8 contains the
discounted annual costs. Column 9 is the cumulative
discounted costs for this model and is equal to the model's
NPV from Table 5.1, Column 2.
3. PPC 159 INCORPORATED, 1,500-HOUR MODEL COSTS
Column 10 shows the undiscounted costs (PPC 159
incorporated, 1,500 hour inspection assumed) taken from Table
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4.7, Column 12 with the total value of the CIP investment up
to 1992 added in (from Table 4.3, Column 13). Column 11
exhibits the cumulative undiscounted costs. Column. 12
displays the discounted costs. Column 10 displays the
cumulative discounted costs for this model which is equal to
the model's NPV from Table 5.1, Column 3.
Table 5.2 DISCOUNTED AND UNDISCOUNTED COST DATA.
COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 COLUMN 3 COLUMN 4 COLUMN 6 COLUMNS COLUMN 7
DISCOUNT WITHOUT WITHOUT PPC 159 WITHOUT WITHOUT PPC 159 PPC 159
FACTOR PPC 159 UNDISCOUNTED PPC 159 PPC 159 750 HR INSPCT 750 HR INSPECT
UNDISCOUNTED CUMULATIVE DISCOUNTED DISCOUNT CUM UNDISCOUNT UNDISC CUM
YEAR
1992 9091 7,601.693 7.601.693 6.910.699 6.910.699 12.668.667 12.868,667
1993 8264 8. 183.259 15,784,951 6,762.645 13.673344 8.018.991 20,887,658
1994 7513 8,910.603 24,695.555 6,694,536 20.367.880 8.156.025 29.043.663
1995 6630 16763.776 41.479.331 11,463,319 31,631,199 14.64 1.502 43,685.185
1996 6209 16.521.992 58 001,323 10.258.505 42089.704 10,675,832 54,461.016
1997 5645 16.207.987 74.209,310 9.149409 61,239,113 10,374.202 64.835.219
1998 05132 15.837.631 90.046,841 8,127,821 59.366.934 10.136,496 74.971.714
1999 4665 14.285.650 104,332,491 6 664.256 66,031.190 9.142,740 84.114.455
2000 04241 12.716,347 117.048,638 5,393.003 71,424,192 8.137,970 92252.425
2001 3855 10.984.222 128.033.060 4.234,417 75.666.610 7.029.134 99.281.558
2002 3505 9,236.563 137.269.623 3.237.415 78.896.025 5,910.486 105192.044
2003 3186 7.315.334 144 584 957 2.330 665 81.226 691 4,680,895 109 872,939
2004 2697 7,464.559 l52.049.s16 2.162.463 83,389,173 4.776199 114 649136
2005 2633 7613,703 159,663.216 2 004 666 65.393.661 4.671.465 119.520,603
2006 2394 7.762,467 167,425.686 1.868.335 87,252.760 4.966.503 124 487.105
COLUMNS COLUMN 9 COLUMN 10 COLUMN 11 COLUMN 12 COLUMN 13
PPC 159 PPC 159 PPC 159 PPC 159 PPC 159 PPC 159
750 HR INSPCT 750 HR INSPECT 1.500 HR INSPCT 1.600 HR INSPCT 1.600 HR INSPCT 1.500 HR INSPECT
DISCOUNTED DISCOUNT CUM UNDISCOUNTED UNDISC CUM DISCOUNTED DISCOUNT CUM
VLAU
1992 H,696.906 11,698.905 12.666.667 12.666.667 11.698 .905 H696.905
1993 6.626.894 18.325.799 8.018,991 20 887.658 6.626.894 18,325,799
1994 6.127.621 24.453.421 8.156.026 29.043683 6.127.621 24 453,421
1995 10.136.746 34,590.166 14.841.502 43.865.185 10,136.746 34,590.166
1996 6566 634 41,166 700 4.169,165 48.054 349 2688.634 37.178,801
1997 5.856.237 47.012,938 4,093,063 52.147.412 2.310,534 39.489.335
1996 5,202,050 62.214.987 4,002.689 56.150,102 2,064,180 41,643,515
1999 4.265.088 56,480.076 3.613.451 59.763.553 1.685,675 43.229,190
2000 3.451.313 69,931.389 3,219,255 62,982,808 1,365.286 44,594,4 76
2001 2709.731 62641,120 2.783.212 65766.020 1.072.926 45.667 404
2002" 2.071,625 64.712,745 2.542.531 68, 106.551 621.057 46,466.461
2003 1,491.333 66.204,078 1.857,038 69,965.689 591,652 47080,114
2004 1.383.665 67,587.743 1,896,780 71,862.370 549.497 47.629,611
2005 1.282.657 68,670.400 1.936.643 73,799,013 509.918 48,139,529
2006 1.188.981 70.059,889 1.976.557 75.775,570 473.188 48,613.266
4. GRAPHIC PORTRAYAL OF LIFE CYCLE COSTS
In Figures 5.1 and 5.2 the author presents a graphical
portrayal of the information in Table 5.2. Figure 5.1 shows
a side-by-side annual comparison of the cumulative discounted
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costs taken from Columns 5, 9, and 13 from Table 5.2. Figure
5.1 clearly shows that the break-even point will occur during
1996 and that the cumulative benefits from PPC 159 increase
over the life of the "406A" engines.
Figure 5.2 shows a side-by-side annual comparison of the
cumulative undiscounted costs taken from Columns 3, 7, and 11
from Table 5.2. Figure 5.2 again clearly shows that the
break-even point will occur during 1996 and that the
cumulative benefits from PPC 159 continue to increase over the
life of the "406A" engines.
From the Break-even point analysis, the CIP effort for
HPT-2 blades can also be considered a success as the
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Figure 5.2. Life Cycle Costs (Dndiscounted)
.
C ADDITIONAL PPC 159 BENEFITS
The author has attempted to make a careful determination
of the costs and benefits of Power Plant Change 159. However,
the author also believes that PPC 159 may potentially offer
additional savings (benefits the author was unable to
quantify). These benefits include:
1. Reduced aircraft attrition. If the incorporation of PPC
159 resulted in even one less aircraft crash over the life
of the "406A, " the CIP venture would pay for itself many
times over (with the cost of an AV-8B roughly between $25
million and $30 million)
.
2. Increased operational availability/readiness. Power
Plant Change 159 reduces the frequency that aircraft are




VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The objectives of this thesis were to:
• Examine the data bases available for extracting logistic
cost/benefit information concerning the F402 engine and
identify problems associated with gathering meaningful
information from these data bases.
• Determine the impact of one significant CIP effort for one
component on the F402 engine (hopefully as a bellwether of
overall CIP cost-effectiveness for the F402).
• Determine whether the component improvement effort for the
selected component was, in fact, cost-effective.
• Refine the methodology for analyzing the Component
Improvement Program for the F402.
To achieve the objectives of this thesis, Power Plant Change
159 was selected for evaluation. PPC 159 aimed at improving
the High Pressure Turbine, Second Stage blades on the F402-RR-
4 06A model engine.
Chapter I provided the nature of the CIP issue and the
motivation for CIP research. Chapter I also provided the
thesis objectives, scope and organization for study. Chapter
II provided a literature review of previous CIP research
conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School and the Institute
for Defense Analysis. Chapter III oriented the reader to
specific background information concerning the F402 engine and
Power Plant Change 159. Chapter III further described the
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reason for choosing PPC 159 for study, a history of HPT-2
blades (to explain how the CIP effort for blades developed)
,
and maintenance data collection problems.
Chapter IV presented both the historic and estimated life
cycle monetary costs for HPT-2 blades for the "406A" model
engine with and without PPC 159 incorporated. Two
incorporation scenarios were considered (because sufficient
single crystal blade reliability information was not
available) . Chapter V presented cost/benefit analyses of PPC
159. These analyses included making comparisons of the models
presented in Chapter IV through a Net Present Value analysis
and a Break-even analysis.
B. CONCLUSIONS
From the results of the analysis conducted in Chapter V,
PPC 159 is clearly cost-effective. The Net Present Value
analysis revealed that PPC 159 will save between 17.2 million
dollars and 38.6 million dollars depending on the reliability
of single crystal HPT-2 blades. The break-even point will
occur sometime during 1996 regardless.
Predicting the expected reductions in maintenance and
supply support costs as a consequence of an F402 CIP effort is
a difficult and intriguing process. Complicating this process
is the dynamic nature of the F402 engine program and the
corresponding Work Unit Code changes. F402 engine models are
frequently changed and result in a narrow time window to
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collect sufficient maintenance data (both before and after the
PPC) from fleet use for cost-benefit analyses. In addition,
Power Plant Changes are usually accomplished by first
opportunity and may take several years to be fully
incorporated. By the time a PPC is fully incorporated, the
engine model may change due to another PPC. Further
complicating the process is the difficulty in collecting and
interpreting maintenance data and in determining the validity
of available sources. These issues have been identified by
other investigators including Butler [Ref. 7], Gordon [Ref.
8], Jones [Ref. 10], and Murphy [Ref. 11].
Because this thesis only examined one component, the
reader is cautioned against interpreting the results of this
study as conclusive for every component improved under the CIP
program for the F402 engine. Indeed, HPT-2 blades are not
really part of the CIP because they are internal rather than
external to the engine.
C . RECOMMENDATIONS
The author recommends that a follow-up study concerning
PPC 159 be conducted to validate the cost and life cycle
benefit estimates produced in this thesis. This follow-up
study should be conducted when PPC 159 is fully incorporated
and sufficient fleet single crystal blade usage is available
(no failures have yet occurred)
.
The author also recommends that further thesis efforts
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consider F402 components serviced at the depot level of
maintenance. As identified in this thesis, depot labor and
material costs are the largest part of the maintenance costs.
Further research could possibly lead to a classification
scheme based on the extent to which the component under the
proposed CIP effort is serviced at the depot level. If depot
level repairables offer the greatest potential for life cycle
savings, then perhaps engine managers could prioritize (under
a constrained budget environment) Engineering Change Proposals
according to who (depot, intermediate, organizational) repairs
the component
.
Also, if depot labor and material costs are the largest
part of maintenance costs, then consideration should be given
to transferring repair authority of more engine components
from the depot level to the intermediate level. Further
research could possibly identify F402 components (currently
repaired at the depot level) which could be more economically
repaired at the "I" level. This issue is currently pertinent
as the Department of Defense considers closing the Navy's
Depots in favor of granting all fixed-wing depot overhauls
(for all the Services) to the Air Force.
Jones [Ref
. 10] and Murphy [Ref . 11] both recommended that
training in the NALDA system be made available (and take
priority) at the Naval Postgraduate School. As a viable
alternative to lengthy training at NPS, the author recommends
that the customized, user friendly reports produced by the SYS
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company (produced from NALDA system data) and by NAMSO
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